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Abstract. Activation Codes are used in many different digital services
and known by many different names including voucher, e-coupon and
discount code. In this paper we focus on a specific class of ACs that are
short, human-readable, fixed-length and represent value. Even though
this class of codes is extensively used there are no general guidelines for
the design of Activation Code schemes. We discuss different methods that
are used in practice and propose BEPAC, a new Activation Code scheme
that provides both authenticity and confidentiality. The small message
space of activation codes introduces some problems that are illustrated by
an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (CPA-2) on a general 3-round Feis-
tel network of size 22n. This attack recovers the complete permutation
from at most 2n+2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs. For this reason, BEPAC
is designed in such a way that authenticity and confidentiality are in-
dependent properties, i.e. loss of confidentiality does not imply loss of
authenticity.
Keywords: activation code, e-coupon, voucher, Feistel network, small
domain encryption, financial cryptography.
1 Introduction
This paper introduces Activation Codes (ACs) as a generic term for codes that
are used in many different digital services. They are known by many different
names including voucher, e-coupon and discount code. The common properties
of these codes are that they need to be short, human-readable, have a fixed
length and can be traded for economic benefit. There are schemes [4,5,8] that
include all kinds of property information in the code itself or include digital
signatures [14,12]. This makes the codes unsuitable for manual entry and thus
for printing on products, labels or receipts. The focus of this paper is on ACs
that can be printed and manually entered such as the AC that is printed on a
receipt in Figure 1. In this case the customer can enter the AC ‘TY5FJAHB’ on a
website to receive some product. We propose a scheme called BEPAC to generate
and verify this class of ACs. BEPAC is an acronym for Best Effort and Practice
Activation Codes. Here ‘best practice’ covers the use of a keyed hash function to
satisfy authenticity and ‘best effort ’ covers the use of a Feistel network to satisfy
confidentiality.
Fig. 1: Activation Code
Security plays an important role in the
design of an AC system because of the
economic value it represents. A system
breach could result in big financial losses.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there are no guidelines on the de-
sign of secure AC systems that consider
the previously mentioned properties. De-
spite the lack of general guidelines for
good practice, ACs are extensively used.
This underlines the need for a proper AC
scheme that relies on elementary, well-
studied, cryptographic primitives to provide authenticity and confidentiality.
First, we discuss some examples that illustrate the need for a scheme that pro-
vides both confidentiality and authenticity. Then, we give a general definition of
an AC scheme and use it as a reference throughout this paper.
Our Contribution This paper addresses some known methods that are used to
generate ACs and proposes BEPAC, an AC scheme that combines best effort
with best practice. BEPAC is based on well-studied cryptographic primitives
to guarantee unique and authentic codes that provide a satisfactory level of
confidentiality. Confidentiality is obtained by a Feistel construction. The Feistel
construction has weak theoretical bounds when it is used on a small domain,
therefore we do not rely on it for authenticity. We use the work of Black and Ro-
gaway [3] on small domain encryption and make some small changes to achieve
confidentiality. A practical attack on a general 3-round Feistel network is pre-
sented to demonstrate the weak bounds of the Feistel construction. For authen-
ticity, we solely rely on a keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) of
the serial number, where the size of this HMAC determines the probability of
successfully guessing a valid AC. This separated design allows a separate anal-
ysis of both confidentiality and authenticity. An advantage of this approach is
that authenticity is not automatically compromised when confidentiality is bro-
ken. Finally, a BEPAC solution fits on a smart card and therefore allows AC
generation and clearance to be performed in a controlled environment.
Related Work Black and Rogaway [3] propose the Generalized Feistel Cipher
(GFC) as a solution to small domain encryption. This elegant solution can be
used to construct a permutation on any finite domain. In the BEPAC scheme we
use their method in a slightly adapted way and solely to provide confidential-
ity. Black and Rogaway provide an adapted proof of Luby [15] to prove secrecy
of a 3-round Feistel network. However, in their example configuration, the sin-
gle DES round function does not give the 3 × 56-bit security since single DES
can be broken by exhaustive key search [25]. Moreover, in this setting it can
be broken round by round which actually means that we have 58-bit security.
Bellare et al. [2] propose 128-bit AES as a pseudo-random function which dras-
tically increases the effort needed to break one round of the Feistel network
by brute-force. However, the adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (CPA-2) on a 3-
round Feistel network presented in this paper shows that the key length of the
pseudo-random function used in each round does not have any influence on the
attack complexity. Research on Feistel networks [22,20,19,15,13,21] has resulted
in theoretical security bounds. Feistel constructions of six or more rounds are se-
cure against adaptive chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks (CPCA-2)
when the number of queries m≪ 2n, see [22,13]. There is more related literature
on the design of ACs, but to the best of our knowledge there are no proposals
for the class of AC schemes that we discuss in this paper. Blundo et al. [4,5,8]
introduce an e-coupon which is 420 bytes in size. This scheme uses a message
authentication code (MAC) over some characterizing data like the identity of
the manufacturer, name of the promoted product, expiry date etc. The resulting
e-coupons contain valuable information but are too large to be entered manually
by a user. In the work of Kumar et al. [14] and Jakobssen et al. [12] a coupon is
basically a digital signature which also means that they describe relatively large
e-coupons. Chang et al. [6] recognize the problem of efficiency and describe a
scheme that is more suitable for mobile phones that have less processing power.
On the one hand, they circumvent the use of public key cryptography which
reduces the computational complexity, but on the other hand, their scheme de-
scribes relatively long codes. None of the schemes described previously satisfy
the requirement of short codes that can be entered manually.
Matsuyama and Fujimura [17] describe a digital ticket management scheme
that allows users to trade tickets. The authors discuss an account based and a
smart card based approach and try to treat different ticket types that are solely
electronically circulated. This in contrast with BEPAC which focuses on codes
that can easily be printed on product wrappings. Our intention is not to define
a trading system where ACs can be transfered from one person to another. Such
contextual requirements are defined in RFC 3506 as Voucher Trading Systems
(VTS). Terada et al. [28] come with a copy protection mechanism for a VTS and
use public key cryptography. This makes the vouchers only suitable for electronic
circulation. Furthermore, RFC 3506 and [17] do not discuss methods on how to
generate these vouchers securely. We propose the BEPAC scheme in order to fill
this gap.
2 AC Scheme Selection
This section first discusses some examples of AC systems. Then, two different
approaches to set up an AC scheme are discussed and their main drawbacks
are visited. After this, the Generalized Feistel Cipher of [3] is introduced in
Section 2.1 which has some useful concepts that we use in our scheme. The
focus of an AC scheme design lays on scalability, cost-efficiency and off-line use.
Finally, forgery of ACs should be hard, an adversary is only able to forge ACs
with a very small predefined probability.
Examples of Activation Codes First, we discuss some examples of ACs in real
life. A good first example is the scratch prepaid card that is used in the telecom-
munication industry. To use a prepaid card, the customer needs to remove some
foil and reveals a code that can be used to obtain mobile phone credits. Then we
have the e-coupon which is a widely used replacement for the conventional paper
coupon. An e-coupon represents value and is used to give financial discount or
rebate at the checkout of a web shop. The last example is a one-time password
that gives access to on-line content. This content should only be accessible to
authenticated people who possess this unique password; think of sneak previews
of new material or software distribution.
All the aforementioned examples use unique codes that should be easy to
handle, that is, people should be able to manually copy ACs without much
effort. At the same time, it should be impossible for an adversary to use an
AC more than once or autonomously generate a new valid AC. Altogether, ACs
are unique codes that have to guarantee authenticity. An AC system provides
authenticity when an adversary is not able to forge ACs. It is a misconception
that authenticity only is enough for an AC scheme. In the end, most AC systems
are used in a competitive environment. When vendor A starts a campaign where
ACs are used to promote a product and provide it for free to customers, then
it is not desirable that vendor B finds out details about this campaign like the
number of released ACs. Other sensitive details might be the value that different
ACs represent or the expiry date of ACs. It is for this reason that we need
confidentiality, which means that an adversary is not able to recognize patterns
or extract any information from a released AC.
Many systems use codes that need to provide the properties discussed above.
In this paper we refer to all these codes as ACs. By an AC scheme S we indicate
a tuple (A,N ,P , λ) where A is the size of the used alphabet, N is the number
of desired ACs, P determines the probability P = 1P of an adversary guessing
an AC and λ is the length of the ACs.
Database Approach The database approach is very straightforward and con-
sists of a database that contains all the released ACs and their current status.
The generation of new AC entries is done by a pseudo-random function. When
a customer redeems an AC, its status is set to ‘used’. An advantage of the
database approach is that the randomness of the ACs is directly related to the
randomness of the pseudo-random generator. So, it is important to select a good
pseudo-random generator, e.g. a FIPS certified one. On the other hand, the
protection of this valuable data is still a problem. For instance, if an attacker
manages to add entries to the database or is able to change the record status
to ‘unused’, it will be hard to detect this fraud in time. Also, it is necessary to
check any new AC against all existing entries since there might be a collision.
As a consequence, access to the complete set of ACs is needed on generation of
new ACs.
Block Cipher Approach Another approach is to use a block cipher that gives
a random permutation F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n from serial numbers to ACs. The
provider maintains a counter i to keep track of the number of generated ACs.
This way the authenticity of a serial number can be checked since only ACs
that decrypt to a serial < i are valid. A disadvantage of this method is the size
of the resulting AC which is 128-bits for AES and 64-bits for 3DES. For AES,
this results in a string of about 21 characters when we use numbers, upper-
and lowercase characters in our alphabet. For 3DES, this is about 11 characters.
Smaller block ciphers do exist, like Katan [10] which is 32-bits, but are not
very well-studied. Furthermore, block ciphers force ACs to have a length that
is a multiple of the block size b. An alternative could be the concept of elastic
block ciphers [9] which is an extended scheme where variable message sizes are
allowed as input. Moreover, this scheme uses well-studied block ciphers. Still,
the minimal size of a plaintext message is the block size b of the incorporated
block cipher. So, this does not give any advantage and is still too large for our
target, which is roughly 20 to 50-bit codes.
2.1 Small Domain Ciphers
Black and Rogaway introduce the Generalized Feistel Cipher (GFC) in [3]. The
GFC is designed to allow the construction of arbitrary domain ciphers. Here,
arbitrary domain means a domain space that is not necessarily {0, 1}n. For ACs
we want to use a small domain cipher where the domain size can be customized
to a certain extent, therefore we look into the proposed method in [3]. Before
we describe the Generalized Feistel Cipher, we briefly visit the basic Feistel
construction.
Fig. 2: Feistel
Feistel Network A Feistel network [16] is a permutation that
takes an input x of size 2n, then performs a number of rounds r
with round functions f1, ..., fr, and finally delivers an output y of
size 2n. The input is split into two blocks 〈L,R〉 ∈ {0, 1}2×n. As
shown in Figure 2, every right block is input to a round function
fi. The output of this function is combined with the left block
and becomes the new right block, e.g. L′ = f1(R) + L for GFC.
The original right block becomes the new left block. For the ease
of decryption the last output blocks are swapped in case of an
odd number of rounds (which is the case in Fig. 2).
Generalized Feistel Cipher The GFC of Black and Rogaway [3] was intro-
duced to handle flexible domain sizes. Take for example an encryption E : 514 →
514 which is not a domain that is captured by standard block cipher algorithms.
The BEPAC scheme borrows some of the ideas of GFC to be able to construct
arbitrarily sized AC configurations.
In GFC the left and right block of the Feistel network are “similarly sized”
which means that their domain size may deviate a little. For the particular
case of ACs we have looser restrictions on the arbitrariness of our domain and
we can increase the guessing probability P to influence the domain size. As a
consequence, the system parameters of BEPAC can be chosen such that the left
and right block are equally sized.
An obvious way to use the Feistel network is to create a pseudo-random
permutation F : K ×M →M where K and M are the key space and message
space respectively. To generate ACs, we take as plaintext an index i and use the
resulting ciphertext as AC α. In order to check α the provider keeps track of the
last index i and considers a given α valid when F−1(α) ≤ i. This construction
guarantees:
1. Collision-freeness, since F is a permutation.
2. Valid serial numbers, they cannot be predicted since F is a pseudo-random
permutation.
As Black and Rogaway already conclude in [3] the Generalized Feistel Cipher
has weak security bounds when used in applications where the message space is
roughly from k = 230 up to k = 260. This suggests that our second argument
might not be that strong.
Also, the serial i is kept secret and one might argue that this presumes un-
forgeability. However, the way i is embedded allows an adversary to make useful
assumptions about i since the ACs are generated using consecutive numbers. In
the GFC, the left block L and right block R are initiated as follows:
L = i mod 2n, R = ⌊i/2n⌋
Here, L represents the least significant bits of i, and the successor of every i
always causes a change in L. On the contrary, when i is sequentially incremented,
the value of R changes only once every 2n times. This way, the first 2n ACs are
generated with R = 0, the second 2n ACs with R = 1, etc. The problems that
this little example already points out are further explained in the next section.
3 Feistel Permutation Recovery using CPA-2
In this section we present a practical attack on a three-round Feistel construction
in order to illustrate the problem of choosing a small number of rounds and using
a serial embedding as suggested by Black and Rogaway [3].
Theorem 1. Consider a three-round 2n-bit Feistel construction. Then there ex-
ists an algorithm that needs at most 2n+2 adaptive chosen plain-/ciphertext pairs
to compute any ciphertext from any plaintext and vice versa without knowledge
of the secret round keys and regardless the used key length.
Proof. The two ciphertext blocks are defined in terms of the plaintext blocks as
follows:
R′ = f2(f1(R) + L) +R
L′′ = f3(f2(f1(R) + L) +R) + f1(R) + L
= f3(R
′) + f1(R) + L
(1)
Note that L′′ uses R′ as input to f3(·). With Li we denote L = i and similarly
Rj denotes R = j. The notation R
′
(i,j) means the value of R
′ when Li and
Rj are used as input blocks. We first observe that several triples (f1, f2, f3)
lead to the same permutation and show that it is always possible to find the
triple with f1(0) = 0. To this end, if we replace the triple (f1, f2, f3) with the
triple (f ′1, f
′
2, f
′
3) defined by Equation (2), this leads to the same permutation
(Equation (1)) with the desired property that f ′1(0) = 0.
f ′1(x) = f1(x)− f1(0), f
′
2(x) = f2(x+ f1(0)), f
′
3(x) = f3(x)+ f1(0) (2)
So, without loss of generality we may assume that f1(0) = 0.
Next, we describe a method to find a triple (f1, f2, f3) with f1(0) = 0. First,
we determine f2, then f1 and finally f3.
By Equation (1) we get f2:
f2(f1(R0) + Li) = R
′
(i,0) −R0 = R
′
(i,0) ⇒ f2(Li) = R
′
(i,0) (3)
Now, to find f1 observe that f1(j) is a solution for x in the equation f2(x) =
R′(0,j) − Rj . However, this equation does not always have one unique solution
since f2 is a pseudo-random function. In case of multiple solutions we compare
the output of successive (wrt. x) function inputs with the values for f2(x + i)
that were found using Equation (3). Then, the correct x is the unique solution
to:
f2(x+ i) = R
′
(i,j) −Rj for i = 0, . . . ,m (4)
Sometimes m = 0 already gives a unique solution. At the end of this section we
show that with very high probability m = 1 defines a unique solution. We find:
f1(j) = x (5)
When f1 and f2 are both determined, L and R can be chosen such that every
value for R′ ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1} is visited. Since R′ functions as direct input to f3
it is possible to find all input-output pairs for f3. To visit every possible input
value z = 0, . . . , 2n − 1 find a pair Li, Rj such that R′(i,j) = z. First, find an
index x such that f2(x) = z −Rj . If such an x does not exist choose a different
value for Rj . There is always a solution for x since Rj covers the whole domain
of f2. Second, derive Li:
f2(f1(Rj) + Li) = f2(x) ⇒ Li = x− f1(Rj) (6)
Note that the determination of Li and Rj does not need any intermediate queries
since it is completely determined by f1 and f2. Next, we query the system with
Li and Rj and use Equation (3) and (5) to compute f3 as follows:
f3(x) = L
′′
(i,j) − f1(Rj)− Li (7)
This completes the solution for a triple (f1, f2, f3) that results in the same per-
mutation as the Feistel construction under attack.
Number of Queries The determination of f2 is given by Equation (1) and costs
2n queries. The determination of f1 is given by Equation (4). The probability p
that there exists an x′ 6= x for a preselected x such that
(f2(x) = f2(x
′)) ∧

 ∧
i=1,...,m
f2(x+ i) = f2(x
′ + i)

 (8)
can be split into two parts. First, we have the probability p1 that there is a
collision f2(x) = f2(x
′) with x 6= x′. Then, the second probability p2 covers
cases where a preselected position f2(x + i) has the same value as some other
preselected position f2(x
′ + i). We take k = 2n and the two probabilities are
then given by p1 = 1 − (
k−1
k )
(k−1) and p2 =
1
k . Now, p = p1 · p2
m because
we need to multiply by p2 for every other successive match. To conclude, the
probability that there is an x′ 6= x for a Feistel construction of size 2 · k and
with m successive queries, i.e. the probability that there is no unique solution x
to Equation (4), is the probability
p =
1
km
−
1
km
·
(
k − 1
k
)k−1
(9)
So, p < 1km and depending on the size k, m = 1 already gives p close to zero.
In practice one might sometimes need an additional query (m = 2) or only one
query (m = 0), but on averagem = 1. This means that the cost for determination
of f1 is 2 · 2n queries on average. Then, the determination of f3 is given by
Equation (7) and costs at most 2n queries. As a result, the determination of
(f1, f2, f3) has an upper bound of 2
n+2 queries.
4 BEPAC Scheme
In this section we propose our Activation Code Scheme called BEPAC. Its pri-
mary objective is to ensure authenticity and its secondary objective is to provide
confidentiality. Confidentiality is satisfied up to the security bounds given by
Black and Rogaway in [3]. In the BEPAC scheme, loss of confidentiality does
not affect the authenticity property.
The authenticity is achieved in an obvious way by the use of an HMAC which
is a keyed hash function. We take the truncated HMAC h of a sequence number
i and concatenate it to i itself. For this concatenation we use an embedding
m like the one used by Black and Rogaway in [3] and Spies in [2]. We rely on
the strength of the underlying hash function which covers the best practice part
of our solution: ACs are not forgeable. The length of an HMAC is usually too
long for the ease of use that is demanded for ACs. Therefore we introduce the
probability P = 1P that puts a lower bound on the success rate of guessing correct
ACs. We use this parameter to limit the length of the codes, i.e. P determines
the size of the HMAC. A lower success probability for an adversary is achieved
by concatenating a bigger part of the HMAC and thus results in a longer AC.
Our solution differs from encryption schemes for small domains [3,18] in the
sense that we make a clear separation between the part that provides authen-
ticity and the part that provides confidentiality. The latter is added as an ad-
ditional operation on the embedding m. We use a balanced Feistel construction
as proposed in [3] to create the necessary confusion and diffusion. This separa-
tion between authenticity and confidentiality is really different from an approach
where the sequence number i is directly fed into a Feistel construction and when
it solely depends on this construction for its authenticity. The attack in Section 3
demonstrates that we cannot rely on a Feistel construction for authenticity when
it is used on a small domain. These results form the basis of our design decision.
4.1 AC Scheme Setup
h i h'
Feistel Network
c h'
Activation Code α
h = s
Serial i
when length is even:
h =  s / A
h' = s mod A
when length is odd:
s = HMAC(i) mod P
w
h
e
n
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e
n
g
th
 i
s 
o
d
d
Fig. 3: BEPAC Scheme
The BEPAC scheme setup is a construction
(see Fig. 3) where an embedding m of an in-
dex i and a part of HMAC(i) are fed into a
Feistel network. Since this is a balanced Feis-
tel network, m needs to be divided into two
equally sized blocks. When this is not possible
a small part h′ of HMAC(i) bypasses the Feis-
tel network and is embedded together with the
cryptogram c from the Feistel network to form
AC α.
The BEPAC scheme S is a tuple
(A,N ,P , λ, ω) where A is the size of the al-
phabet, λ+ ω is the length of the ACs where
λ is always even and ω is either 0 or 1. Then,
N is the number of ACs and P determines the
probability P = 1P of obtaining a valid AC by
a random guess, e.g. P = 10.000. We assume A < P .
Definition 1 (Valid AC Scheme). An AC scheme S = (A,N ,P , λ, ω) is
valid when Aλ > N ×P ×A−ω holds and λ is even.
A valid AC scheme S can be obtained as follows:
(a) The user chooses the alphabet size A, desired number of ACs N and some
minimal guess probability 1P .
(b) Now the minimal length λ is calculated such that Aλ >= N × P by taking
λ =
⌈
Alog(N ×P)
⌉
(c) |Aλ −N × P| is minimized by taking P = ⌊Aλ/N⌋
(d) The length λ can be either odd or even:
– When λ = 2k+ 1 and A < P then we adjust P such that A is a divisor
of P . As a consequence, we might have a larger number of ACs N .
P = P − (P mod A), N = ⌊Aλ/P⌋
After these operations we obtain the system S = (A,N ,P , λ− 1, 1).
– When λ = 2k we obtain the system S = (A,N ,P , λ, 0).
(e) The process is repeated from step (a) when no valid system S is found.
4.2 Generation
This section describes the generation of new ACs once a valid AC scheme is con-
figured. Algorithm 1 contains the pseudo code for AC generation. The plaintext
is an embedding m of a part of HMAC(i) and i itself. In case of an odd AC
length (ω = 1) a small part h′ of HMAC(i) is excluded from this embedding.
The part of HMAC(i) that is used in m is determined by P .
s = HMAC(i) mod P , h = ⌊s×A−ω⌋, h′ = s mod A, m = h×N+i
The balanced Feistel construction is defined with:
k = A(λ/2), L = m mod k, R = ⌊m / k⌋
L and R are input blocks with size k of a balanced Feistel network. We denote
the output blocks after r rounds by L⋆ and R⋆. When the number of rounds r
is even the cryptogram c is given by:
c = R⋆ × k + L⋆
When r is odd, the left and right block are swapped and the cryptogram c is
given by:
c = L⋆ × k +R⋆
This difference between odd and even is there to allow the same construction for
encoding and decoding. Finally, the activation code α is given by:
α = c×Aω + ωh′
4.3 Verification
This section describes the verification of previously generated ACs for a valid
AC scheme. Algorithm 2 contains the pseudo code for AC verification. Given an
AC α and an AC scheme S the validity can be checked as follows. First compute
c and h′ from α:
c = ⌊α/Aω⌋ , h′ = α mod Aω
The balanced Feistel construction is defined with input block size k = A(λ/2).
Now, the input blocks L and R are obtained from c as follows:
L = c mod k, R = ⌊c/k⌋
L and R are input blocks with size k of a balanced Feistel network. We denote
the output blocks after r rounds by L⋆ and R⋆. In this case we want to decrypt
and therefore use the round keys in reverse order. When the number of rounds
r is even the plaintext m is given by:
m = R⋆ × k + L⋆
When r is odd, the left and right block are swapped and the plaintext m is given
by:
m = L⋆ × k +R⋆
Now, we are able to obtain the partial HMAC h and index i from m by:
h = ⌊m/N⌋ , i = m mod N
We calculate the partial HMAC ht and h
′
t like in the encoding, but now we
use the recovered index i. Finally, we say that α is a valid AC iff ht = h and
ωh′t = ωh
′.
Algorithm 1 Generate(i)
k ← A(λ/2)
s← HMAC(i) mod P
h← ⌊s ×A−ω⌋
h′ ← s mod A
m← h×N + i
L← m mod k; R← ⌊m/k⌋
for j ← 1 to r do
tmp← (L + fj(R)) mod k
L← R; R← tmp
end for
if r is odd then
c← L× k + R
else
c← R× k + L
end if
α← c×Aω + ωh′
Algorithm 2 Verify(α)
k← A(λ/2)
c← ⌊α/Aω⌋; h′ ← α mod Aω
L← c mod k; R = ⌊c/k⌋
for j ← r to 1 do
tmp← (L + fj(R)) mod k
L← R; R← tmp
end for
if r is odd then
m← L× k + R
else
m← R× k + L
end if
h← ⌊m/N⌋; i← m mod N
s← HMAC(i) mod P
ht ← ⌊s ×A
−ω⌋
h′t ← s mod A
if ht = h and ωh
′
t = ωh
′
then
Valid
else
Invalid
end if
5 Example Application: Smart Card
In this section we want to give an example of an Activation Code System (ACS).
In an ACS there are a few things that need to be managed. The index i of
the latest generated AC and the ACs that have been used so far. Since this
information is highly valuable and represents financial value it must be well
protected. Think of an application where the ACs are printed on prepaid cards
covered by some scratch-off material. The production of these cards is a very
secured and well-defined process to ensure that activation codes are kept secret
during manufacturing. These cards need to have all kinds of physical properties,
e.g. the AC should not be readable when the card is partly peeled off from the
back. This can be achieved by printing a random pattern on top of the scratch-off
foil.
At some point there is a very critical task to be executed when the ACs
need to be delivered to the manufacturer. An obvious method to do this is to
encrypt the list of ACs with a secret key. Later on in the process, this list of
randomly generated codes needs to be maintained by the vendor who sells the
scratch cards. This induces a big security threat since leakage of this list or
Desired A = 8 A = 20 A = 31
N P N P(×103) l Bits N P(×103) l Bits N P(×103) l Bits
101 103 101 26,214 6 18 101 16 4 18 101 92,352 4 20
102 103 102 20,968 7 21 102 32 5 22 102 286,285 5 25
103 103 103 16,777 8 24 103 64 6 26 103 28,613 5 25
104 103 10.004 13,416 9 27 104 128 7 31 104 88,75 6 30
105 103 100.003 10,737 10 30 105 12,8 7 31 105 275,125 7 35
106 103 1.000.006 68,719 12 36 106 25,6 8 35 1.000.567 27,497 7 35
107 103 10.001.379 54,968 13 39 107 51,2 9 39 10.000.012 85,289 8 40
108 103 100.001.057 43,98 14 42 108 102,4 10 44 100.010.675 264,368 9 45
109 103 1.000.010.575 35,184 15 45 109 10,24 10 44 1.001.045.818 26,412 9 45
Table 1: BEPAC Configurations
unauthorized modification results in financial loss. Especially when it directly
relates to the core business like in the telecommunications industry.
The use of a secure application module (SAM) significantly reduces this risk.
A SAM is typically a tamper-resistant device, often a smart card, which is in
most cases extensively tested and certified in accordance to a standard, e.g.
the Common Criteria3. The elegance of the solution presented in this paper
is that it can be implemented using smart cards. The supplier determines the
probability P , number of codes N , size of character set A and the key K to
be used. An obvious approach is to use two smart cards since the production
and clearance of activation codes are very likely to happen at two different
locations. Both smart cards are initialized using the same AC scheme S and the
same key K. From that moment on the first one only gives out up to N new
activation codes. The second one is used at the clearance house to verify and
keep track of traded activation codes. This can be done by a sequence of bits
where the i-th bit determines whether the i-th activation code has been cleared.
For 1.000.000 activation codes approximately 122 kB of storage is needed. This
fits on a SmartMX card [27] which is available with 144kB of EEPROM. Of
course, multiple cards can be used if more ACs are needed.
6 Analysis
In this section we discuss the system parameters of BEPAC and decide on some
minimal bounds and algorithms. We tested a 6-round BEPAC scheme for obvious
flaws using the NIST random number test [26]. This test implementation also
delivered the numbers in Table 1 which give a good indication of the length l of
the codes compared to different AC scheme configurations. In the left column the
desired values are given for the number of codes N and the guessing probability
P . We tested these different numbers for three different alphabet sizes A.
Number of Rounds We found good arguments to set the minimum number of
rounds to six for the BEPAC scheme. The literature shows that Feistel con-
structions of six or more rounds are secure against adaptive chosen plaintext
and chosen ciphertext attacks (CPCA-2) when the number of queries m ≪ 2n,
3 http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
see [22,13]. Patarin [21] shows that an adversary needs at least 23n/4 encryptions
to distinguish a six-round Feistel construction from a random permutation. A
six round Feistel network sufficiently covers the risk of leaking serial number
information, but this is of course a minimum.
Key Derivation In the BEPAC scheme we need different round keys for every
Feistel round and another different key for the calculation of the HMAC on
the serial. We propose to derive these keys from an initial randomly chosen
key [1] by a key derivation function (KDF). There are several definitions available
for KDFs and we propose to use KDF1 which is defined in ISO 18033-2 [11].
Recommendations for KDFs and their construction can also be found in [7]. The
first key that is derived is used as the key in the HMAC calculation of h and h′
(Section 4). After this the round keys for the Feistel construction are successively
derived.
Pseudo-random Functions Furthermore, we need to decide on the pseudo-random
functions (PRFs) that are used as round functions of the Feistel network. The
pseudo-randomness of the permutation defined by a Feistel network depends
on the chosen PRF in each round [15]. It is straightforward to use a crypto-
graphic hash function since we already need a hash function for the HMAC [24]
calculation and it keeps our AC scheme simple.
Hash Function In the end, the BEPAC scheme is solely based on a single crypto-
graphic hash function. We follow the secure hash standard FIPS 180-3 [23] and
propose to use an approved hash function like SHA-256.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced activation codes (ACs), short codes of fixed
length, that represent value. These ACs should be scalable, cost efficient and
forgery resistant. In the literature, several solutions [4,5,8,14,12,6,17,28,17] han-
dle digital coupons or tickets that are somehow reminiscent to our notion of
ACs. The difference is that most solutions use public key cryptography or other
means that result in lengthy codes. In fact, these solutions come closer to some
extended notion of digital cash and are not meant to give a solution on the gen-
eration of ACs. To the best of our knowledge there is no scheme that focuses
on the class of ACs that are described in this paper (roughly think of 20 to
50-bit codes). Our proposed AC scheme for this class satisfies authenticity and
confidentiality in a way that when confidentiality is compromised it does not
automatically break authenticity and vice versa.
In order to allow a relatively small and arbitrary message space for our AC
scheme we use some of the ideas of Black and Rogaway [3] in their General-
ized Feistel Cipher to satisfy the confidentiality in our scheme. Several stud-
ies [22,20,19,15,13,21] show that the security bounds of Feistel constructions are
not strong enough and thus make the use of Feistel constructions in small do-
mains questionable. To illustrate this, we have demonstrated that CPA-2 allows
an adversary to recover the complete permutation from only 2n+2 plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. Still, the Feistel construction is suitable for the purpose of
confidentiality in our AC scheme. Since confidentiality is a secondary goal, it
relaxes the demands on the security bounds. Furthermore, in BEPAC the plain-
text cannot be predicted which counters the attacks from the literature. And
most important of all, a Feistel construction defines a permutation on the AC
domain, which means in practice that we do not have to store any additional
data in order to remember which ACs are already published and which are not.
To conclude, we found satisfactory system parameters for the minimum num-
ber of Feistel rounds and we defined a method to do the key derivation for the
round keys. Furthermore, we suggested a specific pseudo-random function (PRF)
and hash function for concrete implementations. Finally, we have implemented
the BEPAC scheme4 and performed some statistical tests using the NIST Ran-
dom Number Test [26]. This test did not reveal any obvious flaws.
It might be interesting for future work to create a smart card implementation
of BEPAC as suggested in Section 5.
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